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Abstract. Taxes have complicated effects on the relative attractiveness of foreign di­
rect investments by multinational corporations vs. international portfolio investments by 
individual investors. The paper first examines the relative tax treatment of these two al­
ternative means by which foreign equity can be purchased, then examines time-series and 
cross-section evidence to see to what degree ownership patterns respond to tax distortions. 
While some tax effects do show up in the data, estimated coefficients are small. Nontax 
factors seem to dominate in the choice of form of ownership of foreign corporate equity. 
Taxes and the Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
Individuals can buy equity in foreign firms simply by purchasing these shares in the 
securities market or buying shares in a mutual fund which owns these shares. Alternatively, 
they can buy these shares indirectly by investing further in a domestic corporation which 
then uses the funds to invest in foreign firms. (The first approach is often called portfolio 
investment, while the latter is called foreign direct investment.) Either approach allows 
them to take advantage of the potentially more favorable returns abroad, and allows them 
to diversity their portfolios.1 
The tax law treats the two forms of capital flow very differently, however. In both cases, 
the investor receives a return net of foreign corporate income taxes. In addition, foreign 
withholding taxes on dividend payments must always be paid, though here the tax rate 
often varies depending on whether the shares were purchased by a foreign individual or a 
foreign corporation. If the individual purchased the shares directly, he then owes personal 
income taxes on the dividend income, though normally can receive a credit towards this 
tax for any withholding taxes paid abroad. If instead, the individual purchased the shares 
indirectly, through investment abroad by a corporation he owns shares in, then the tax 
treatment is more complicated. Corporate investments abroad are taxed at home first at 
the corporate level when the income is repatriated, with credits for both foreign withholding 
taxes and foreign corporate income taxes, then again when the income is distributed to 
individual shareholders.2 Any analysis of tax effects on international capital flows is further 
complicated by the importance of tax evasion in this setting. Not only may individuals 
evade domestic taxes on the income they receive from foreign financial securities, but also 
multinational corporations may reduce their combined corporate tax payments by shifting 
their taxable income to lower-tax-rate jurisdictions. 
The relative importance of portfolio equity investment vs. foreign direct investment 
will be affected by more than just tax factors. When corporations invest abroad, they 
acquire both ownership and control over the foreign firms, whereas portfolio investors 
merely acquire ownership. This makes corporate investments more attractive to the extent 
to which there are synergy gains from joint operations of the domestic and foreign firms. 
For example, technology transfers may be much easier within a multinational than between 
two independently owned firms. These technology transfers become more important to the 
extent to which trade barriers prevent the import into the host country of goods produced 
with this technology. Therefore, we expect that foreign direct investment will be relatively 
This paper was prepared for the N.B.E.R. International Tax Conference, that took place in New York 
on September 26-8. We would like to thank conference participants for comments on an earlier draf
t of 
this paper. 
1 See Adler-Du.mas(1983) or French-Poterba(1991) for evidence on the substantial diversification achieved
 
through purchase of foreign equity. 
2 In many countries, individuals can receive a dividend credit under the personal tax for dividends 
received from domestic but not from foreign corporations. 
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more important from industries and countries with more advanced technology, and into 
industries protected by trade barriers. In addition, some countries discourage portfolio 
investment abroad through use of capital controls. How effective these controls are is 
unclear, however. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze how tax and nontax factors affect the relative 
importance of portfolio equity investments vs. foreign direct investments. We estimate 
these relationships using aggregate data on the composition of foreign ownership of U.S. 
equity. We have data on capital flows from ten foreign countries to the U.S. for the period 
1980 - 1989. 
By focusing our study narrowly on the form of ownership of foreign equity, we avoid 
a number of complications that normally arise in any study of international portfolio 
holdings. For example, Adler-Dumas(1983) and French-Poterba(l991) both emphasize 
the puzzling lack of international diversification of equity portfolios. In our study, we take 
as given the total holdings of foreign equity, and focus solely on the form in which this 
foreign equity is owned. Implicitly, we assume that whatever factors explain the lack of 
international diversification of equity portfolios do not also affect the relative attractiveness 
of the two alternative forms of ownership of foreign equity. In addition, many complicated 
factors can affect the degree to which international capital flows take the form of debt vs. 
equity. We take as given the degree to which equity is used, and focus solely on how this 
equity is purchased. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: In section 1, we analyze how taxes distort 
the relative attractiveness of portfolio vs. direct investment. Nontax factors are summa­
rized in section 2. In section 3, we describe the measurement of the various data series 
used in the empirical work, while the empirical results are described in section 4. 
1. Tax distortions 
In order to assess how taxes affect the relative attractiveness of portfolio equity investment 
vs. foreign direct investment, we compare the tax treatment of each type of capital flow. 
Tax treatment of portfolio investment 
Assume that firm f in country c earns pretax economic income, per share, of Xcf · Based 
on the tax code in country c, it has taxable income per share of x~1, and faces a statutory 
corporate income tax rate of rt,3 resulting in corporate tax payments of rt x~1 .4 The firm's 
income net of corporate taxes is therefore Xc1-r1x~1 = XcJ(l-PccT:). Here, Pee= x~1 / Xcf 
measures the ratio between taxable income and economic income for firms in country c 
based on the tax law in country c. For simplicity of notation, let Tc= Peer;. 
Assume that the firm pays out the fraction d of this net income as dividends each period. 
If the share owner lives in country i, then this dividend is subject to a withholding tax at 
3 For simplicity, we ignore variations in effective tax rates by firm. See Swenson(l990) for a comparison 
across U.S. industries of effective tax rates vs. the amount of foreign direct investment in the industry. 
4 If the marginal tax rate varies with income, we adjust the measure of income here so as to produce 
the correct estimate of corporate tax payments. 
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rate Wci.5 Individuals therefore receive income net of foreign taxes of XcJ(l -rc)(l -dwci)-
In principle, share owners still owe personal income taxes on this income. However, it is 
extremely difficult for a government to enforce a tax on foreign-source income. In general, 
taxes on individual investors are primarily enforced either by requiring financial intermedi­
aries to report directly to the government the income earned by domestic residents, or by 
withholding at source. When individuals invest in foreign corporations through domestic 
financial intermediaries, these intermediaries can also be required to report the resulting in­
come of each investor to the government, making enforcement straight-forward.
6 However, 
when residents invest abroad through foreign financial intermediaries, neither approach is 
feasible - these intermediaries cannot be required to withhold taxes for another govern­
ment or report information to another government.
7 Since the home government has little 
ability to detect evasion in these circumstances, investors have little incentive to pay do­
mestic taxes on such income. If they do evade domestic taxes, then their net income is 
simply XcJ(l - Tc)(l - dwci)-
If individuals invest abroad through domestic financial intermediaries, however, then 
the government should be able to monitor their earnings, forcing the individual to pay 
domestic taxes on this income.8 Under standard double-taxation conventions, they are 
taxed at home on their pre-withholding-tax dividends, dxcJ(l - re), but receive a credit 
up to the amount of any domestic taxes owed for the withholding taxes paid abroad. If 
the typical personal tax rate in country ion dividend income is mi, then the net receipts 
of shareholders equal 
(1) 
In addition, the investors receive capital gains, and may owe capital gains taxes if they 
sell shares. For simplicity, however, we ignore capital gains taxes. We will use expression 
(1) to describe the net receipts of portfolio investors even when investors evade personal 
taxes. When evasion is assumed, mi will simply be set equal to zero. 
Tax treatment of corporate direct investment 
If individuals invest abroad through having a domestic corporation in which they hold 
shares invest abroad, the tax treatment is much more complicated. The tax treatment will 
vary depending on the fraction of shares in the foreign firm purchased by the domestic 
corporation. The U.S., for example, requires that a domestic firm own at least ten percent 
5 In practice, this rate need not necessarily equal the statutory rate applying to capital flows between 
country c and country i. Investing using a financial intermediary in a third country may result in a lower 
withholding tax rate. We ignore these complications in the empirical work. 
6 Not all countries do require this reporting by financial intermediaries. Without it, even taxes on 
earnings from domestic financial assets are difficult to enforce, except through withholding at source. 
7 Some countries have information sharing agreements with each other. These agreements, however, do 
not involve automatic transfers of information, but only transfers of information about specific accounts 
which the home government learned about independently. But acquiring this independent information is 
a large part of the problem. 
8 The convenience of using a domestic financial intermediary may outweigh the extra tax burden. In 
principle, the net return given evasion should be reduced to reflect the inconvenience of using foreign 
financial intermediaries. 
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of the shares in a foreign firm to qualify for a credit for taxes paid abroad, and own at least 
fifty percent to be able to pool earnings from this firm with those from other majority­
owned firms abroad. The tax treatment also varies depending on whether the foreign firm 
is organized as a subsidiary or a branch of the domestic firm. In the former case, domestic 
taxes are due only when profits are repatriated, while in the latter case, domestic taxes 
are owed each year on the entire profits.9 For simplicity, we focus on the dominant case, 
that of a subsidiary in which at least fifty percent of the shares are owned by the foreign 
parent. 
The pretax income per share, Xcf, of this subsidiary is still subject to the same corporate 
income tax, at effective rate Tc· Dividend payments are still subject to withholding taxes. 
If the parent is based in country i,10 then the withholding tax rate is denoted by w;i. 
Commonly, w;i < Wei• If the dividend payout rate is still d, then income net of taxes in 
country c equals XcJ(l - rc)(l - dw;i). 
Corporate and personal taxes may still be owed in country i. In countries with a terri­
torial tax system, such as the Netherlands, corporations do not owe tax on foreign-source 
income. Other countries, e.g. Canada and Germany, exempt from domestic corporate taxes 
any foreign-source income earned in countries with which they have signed tax treaties. 
In these cases, the only additional taxes owed are personal taxes on the dividend income. 
In order to equate the dividend payout rate in the cases of individual portfolio investment 
vs. corporate direct investment, we assume that all net-of-tax dividends received from 
abroad are then distributed to individual investors. If we denote by m; the personal tax 
rate on this income, then the final net income equals
11 
(2a) 
Most countries, however, tax the pretax income needed to finance the dividends received 
by domestic corporations from foreign subsidiaries, but allow corporations a credit for any 
corporate and withholding taxes paid abroad. These credits can reduce or eliminate taxes 
due on the foreign-source income, but cannot reduce taxes due on any domestic-source 
income. Consider first the case of a multinational based in country i which invests only 
in firm Jin country c. This multinational receives dividends per share from abroad equal 
to dxc1(l - rc)(l - w;i). Under standard double-taxation conventions, it owes domestic 
corporate taxes on the corporate income, before both corporate and withholding taxes, 
needed to finance these dividends, but receives a credit up to the domestic corporate taxes 
owed for all taxes paid abroad on this income. In particular, if the subsidiary's total income 
before any taxes, as defined under the tax law of country i, is denoted by x!1 , then the 
parent owes domestic taxes at statutory rate r/ on the fraction of this income equal to 
9 
Withholding taxes are also normally owed on the entire net-of-foreign-tax profits of a branch, but 
only on the dividends paid by a subsidiary. 
lO For simplicity, we assume that the parent is located in the same country as the investor. In principle, 
the investor could own shares of a parent based in a third country, or the investment could be ma
de 
through a subsidiary located in a third country, introducing further complications. 
11 Note that credits for withholding taxes paid abroad are not passed through the domestic corporation 
to individual shareholders. 
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the ratio of its dividend receipts to the subsidiary's income net of corporate truces paid to 
country c, and receives a credit for the same fraction of the corporate truces paid to country 
c, as well as for all withholding truces paid. Net corporate truces owed in country ion the 
dividend income dxc1(1 - Tc)(l - w~i) therefore equal 
or zero, whichever is larger. If Pei is defined to equal x!1/xcf, and Tei = PciTt, then 
the parent's dividend receipts net of domestic corporate truces equal, after simple algebra, 
dxcj(l - Tc)min[(l - w;i), (Pei -Tci)/(Pci - Tc)], while the shareholders' income, including 
retained earnings but net of personal truces, equals 
The role of Pei in this expression deserves some discussion. If Pei = 1 and a corporate 
surtruc is due on repatriated income, then this income is truced on net at the same rate as 
domestic-source income - foreign truces are fully rebated. If Pei < 1, however, then the 
effective true rate on repatriated income is higher than that on domestic source income if 
Tei > Tc, and conversely. The understatement of foreign-source income results in too large 
a fraction being truced, for a given amount of dividend repatriations, but it also results in a 
credit for too large a fraction of foreign true payments. The net effect depends on whether 
the foreign or the domestic effective true rate is larger. 
When a multinational invests in several foreign countries, it is normally allowed to pool 
the income repatriated from all of these countries, and credit against the domestic truces 
due on this income any corporate and withholding taxes paid abroad on this income. In 
doing so, it can use excess credits from operations in one country to reduce any domestic 
truces due on operations in another country. If, in total, its credits are sufficient to wipe 
out its domestic true liabilities on its foreign operations, world-wide, then no domestic 
corporate taxes result in particular from its operations in country c. In this case, its final 
net income is the same as in the "territorial" case, as shown in expression (2a). If, in 
contrast, its credits are insufficient to wipe out all domestic taxes due on foreign-source 
income, then it can receive a credit for all corporate and withholding taxes paid in country 
c, even if these taxes exceed the domestic truces due on repatriations from country c. In 
this case, its final net income equals 
(2c) 
Through careful allocation of its investments and timing of its repatriations, a corpo­
rations should normally be able to avoid domestic corporate taxation of its foreign opera­
tions.12 Whenever it invests in a low-tax-rate country, where corporate and withholding 
12 For supporting evidence, see Hines-Hubbard(1989). 
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taxes will be insufficient to offset domestic taxes, it can simultaneously invest in a high­
tax-rate country. Repatriations should then occur simultaneously from each country, so 
that total tax payments abroad just equal total tax liabilities at home, pre credit. Not all 
firms may find this tax planning worth the effort. Planning sufficient to wipe out domestic 
corporate taxes becomes more difficult, if not impossible, when the domestic corporate tax 
rate is high. Therefore, in general, when pooling is allowed, some firms will earn net income 
described by expression (2a) and some will earn net income described by expression (2c). 
The percent facing expression (2c) should rise as Tei rises, where we denote the percent 
facing expression (2c) by 8.13 We therefore will use a weighted average of expressions (2a) 
and (2c) to measure the net income from corporate investments, with weights (1 -8) and 
8. To capture the relation between Tei and(), we let 0 = a+ brci• Theory suggests that 
b > O, and that () = 0 for relatively low T, implying that a = -br' < 0 for some low r'. 
Since 1986, the U.S. requires that repatriations from subsidiaries which are not majority 
owned must each be put in a "separate basket," preventing this pooling of credits. If this 
applied to all firms, then net income would be measured by (2b). However, pooling of 
credits is still allowed among firms that are each majority owned. Therefore, for the U.S. 
the new provisions should not change the incentives faced by most firms. We assume that 
"pooling" is the norm in the countries in our study which use a crediting system. 
Two of the countries in our study use a hybrid system. In particular, France and Italy 
exempt a certain fraction, e, of repatriated foreign-source income from domestic corporate 
taxes.14 On the remaining income, domestic taxes are due on the income received prior to 
withholding taxes paid abroad; the amounts paid in withholding taxes on the remaining 
income can then be claimed as a credit against domestic corporate taxes. Implicitly, 
foreign corporate tax payments are deductible from domestic taxable income. Net domestic 
corporate tax payments then equal dxc1(l -rc)(l -e)(Tei -w;i). After taking into account 
personal income taxes, a firm's net income is 
(2d) 
What factors affect the personal tax rate mF To begin with, mi should equal the value 
mi would take, ignoring evasion.15 When dividend-imputation schemes are available to 
13 Many other factors can affect the likelihood that a corporate surtax is due at repatriation. For one, 
economic and technological factors may cause multinationals based in one country to invest in a quite dif­
ferent set of host countries than do multinationals based in another country. In addition, some countries 
offer "tax sparing," which reduces the corporate surtax due on repatriations from selected countries. Fun­
neling repatriations through these selected countries then reduces the corporate surtax due on investments 
in country c. We have not attempted to control for these other factors. 
14 France exempts 95% of these repatriated earnings, while Italy exempts 60%. 
15 In principle, the two forms of investments may attract different clienteles. For example, if there 
are economies to scale in learning about foreign investment opportunities, only wealthy individuals will 
invest abroad directly. However, equity holdings are sufficiently concentrated in most countries that this 
is unlikely to make much difference. In addition, financial intermediaries such as insurance companies 
and pension plans may face restrictions concerning the amount of foreign securities they can invest in. 
Japan, for example, has had such restrictions, though they were eased somewhat in 1986. In principle, 
the composition of equity purchased outside of these intermediaries can be adjusted to offset the effects 
of such restrictions, but the offset is complete only if enough equity would be purchased outside of these 
plans. 
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domestic investors in domestic corporations, however, mi but not mi will be reduced. 
Under these schemes, an investor in country i receiving dividends of b from a domestic 
corporation is imputed to have received dividends of b/(1- si), for some tax parameter si, 
which are then taxable under the personal income tax. However, the investor gets a tax 
credit of Sib/(1 - Si)- On net, therefore, the individual owes taxes of (mi - Si)b/(1 - Si), 
so that m'l = (mi - Si)/(1 - Si)- Under a full imputation scheme, Si = rt- On net, m'l is 
always less than or equal to mi. 
Countries do, however, try to restrict investors' ability to use the dividend-imputation 
scheme on dividends from domestic corporations financed by earnings from abroad. Typi­
cally, countries require that dividends eligible for the dividend-imputation scheme be less 
than the firm's after-tax profits from domestic operations. Unless a firm desires an abnor­
mally high dividend payout rate, however, this restriction is unlikely to be binding. In the 
empirical work, we have assumed that these restrictions are not binding. 
What about evasion of personal taxes? When individuals buy shares in domestic cor­
porations, in principle the government can require that these corporations report to the 
government the dividends paid to all domestic residents, making the tax on dividends eas­
ily enforceable. Alternatively, the government can withhold taxes on dividends at source. 
Evasion cannot be ruled out, however. Some countries, for example, do not require firms 
to file such reports. Even if they do require firms to file such reports, individuals can buy 
shares in domestic corporations through foreign financial intermediaries, making it diffi­
cult or impossible for the government to learn independently how much dividends these 
individuals receive. 16 To allow for the possibility of evasion, we will try replacing mi by 
min(mr,0) in some of the regressions described below. We try this alternatively for all 
countries and for just the countries in continental Europe, where evasion seems to be more 
prevalent. 
So far, we have assumed that the dividend payout rate is the same for corporate and 
portfolio investments. In general, dividend payments result in extra taxes, so firms should 
avoid dividend payments unless the nontax gains from these payments outweigh their tax 
cost. These nontax factors could include cash needs of the shareholders as in Poterba­
Summers(1985), the desire to limit agency costs as in Easterbrook(1984), or the signaling 
role of dividends as in Bhattacharya(1979). With portfolio investment, the dividend pay­
out rate is chosen by the foreign firm based presumably on the nontax factors affecting 
its domestic shareholders. With corporate direct investment, in contrast, the parent can 
choose separately the dividend payout rate from the subsidiary to the parent and the divi­
dend payout rate from the parent to the shareholders, in each case based on considerations 
affecting shareholders in country i. To the extent it gains from this extra flexibility, there is 
more of an advantage to corporate direct investment than is seen comparing equations (2a) 
and (2c) with equation (1). Hines-Hubbard(1989), for example, shows that subsidiaries 
appear to time their payouts to their parents so as to avoid surtaxes at repatriation, while 
Hines(1991) reports that parents have much higher payout rates to shareholders than do 
firms without foreign subsidiaries, perhaps because signaling is more important for firms 
16 In this case, however, the investor must pay the withholding taxes due on repatriations to the country 
of the foreign financial intermediary. Presumably, investors would seek out intermediaries in countries 
facing low withholding tax rates. 
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with foreign operations. Firms therefore do seem to take advantage of the flexibility they 
have over dividend patterns. 
Similarly, the above discussion assumes the same use of debt finance, regardless of the 
form of ownership. In general, firms in countries with high corporate tax rates should 
borrow relatively more, using bonds denominated in the currencies of countries with high 
inflation rates. 17 Multinationals may have extra flexibility, however. For example, a multi­
national may face less risk of default, since it can pool relatively independent risks from 
its operations in two different countries, so be able to borrow more. In addition, if it can 
use its combined assets as collateral for loans, regardless of which firm does the borrow­
ing, then it can concentrate its borrowing in the country where the deductions are more 
valuable. The gain from doing so would be greater the larger the difference in marginal 
tax rates applicable to interest deductions in the two countries. To the degree to which 
multinationals respond to these differences, there is more of an advantage to corporate 
direct investment in countries with extreme tax rates, both high and low, than is seen 
comparing equations (2a) and (2c) with equation (1). 
We have also ignored any flexibility a multinational has to shift its taxable income 
towards countries with lower tax rates. They can do this not only through manipulation 
of the transfer prices used for goods and services traded between the subsidiary and the 
parent, but also through such devices as the location of ownership of corporate patents. The 
gain from shifting a given amount of taxable income to the low-tax country is proportional 
to the absolute value of the difference in the marginal tax rates affecting income accruing 
in each country. 
To try to capture the gains available to a multinational through reallocation of interest 
deductions, and taxable income more generally, we include in the regression the absolute 
value of the difference in the statutory corporate tax rates in the two countries, abs(rt -
rt). 18 Harris et al(1991) do find that reported profits of U.S.-based multinationals vary 
as forecast with the corporate tax rates faced by their foreign subsidiaries, supporting this 
story. 
Comparison of net tax rates 
How do the net tax rates compare on portfolio investments vs. corporate direct invest­
ments? On portfolio investments, the investors' net income from an investment in firm 
Jin country c equals XcJ(l - rc)[l - dmax(mi, Wei)]. On corporate direct investment by 
multinationals based in countries using the credit system, we have measured the net income 
from the same investment by a weighted average of expressions (2a) and (2c) (with weights 
(1 - 8) and 8) plus the gain from transfer pricing of ,abs(r; - rt), where , measures the 
relative importance of this term. 
After some simplification, the net tax advantage of portfolio investment can be ex­
pressed by 
17 See Gordon(1986) for further discussion. 
18 The overall marginal tax rate on income accruing in each country may be more complicated due to
 
the surtaxes when profits are repatriated. 
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(3) 
where Aci = (1 - Tc)/(Pci - Tc)· This expression consists of three terms. The first term 
describes the tax advantage if corporate investors owe no domestic corporate taxes when 
profits are repatriated. Corporate investors cannot claim a credit for withholding taxes 
against their personal tax liabilities, whereas portfolio investors can, giving an advantage 
to portfolio investments. Both withholding tax rates and personal tax rates tend to be 
lower, however, for corporate investments. The second term measures the extra tax burden 
corporate investors face if they are in a deficit-credit position, so pay at least some domestic 
corporate taxes on repatriated earnings. The third term measures the tax advantage 
corporate investors have through use of transfer pricing. 
In sum, portfolio investors gain because they may be able to avoid domestic personal 
taxes on their foreign-source income, and by construction they face no domestic corporate 
taxes at repatriation. If they do pay personal taxes, they can claim a credit for with­
holding taxes. Corporate investors, in contrast, may well owe domestic corporate taxes at 
repatriation. On their foreign operations as a whole, these domestic taxes are always non­
negative. However, by operating in a particular high-tax-rate country, they may reduce 
their domestic corporate taxes by using excess credits from operations in that country to 
reduce domestic taxes due on other foreign operations, so that the second term in equation 
(3) can sometimes be negative. Corporate investors also often face lower withholding tax 
rates on their repatriations, and can take advantage of transfer pricing. Even if their share­
holders cannot evade personal income taxes, these personal tax obligations are reduced in 
countries which use a dividend imputation scheme. On net, the sign as well as the size of 
the net tax distortion will vary by country and over time. 
For multinationals based in territorial countries, no corporate surtaxes are due at repa­
For France and Italy,triation, so that the second term in equation (3) would be zero. 
however, which use a hybrid system, this second term would equal the corporate taxes due 
at repatriation, so would equal dxc1(l - Tc)(l - e)(1 - mt)(Tei - w;i ). 
2. Nontax factors 
Many nontax factors also affect the relative importance of portfolio vs. corporate invest­
ments abroad. One key difference between the two is that corporate investments abroad 
allow joint control and operation of production in the two countries, whereas portfolio in­
vestments just affect ownership of the firm's income. Consider, for example, the situation 
of a firm based in country i that owns a distinct product or technology that can profitably 
be manufactured in country c. This could occur because factor prices in country c are more 
favorable, e.g. wage rates are lower and the firm's production is relatively labor intensive; 
it could occur because transportation costs make it cheaper to produce the good nearer 
the foreign customers, e.g. shipping the syrup for Coca Cola is cheaper than shipping the 
bottled soda; it could occur because trade barriers prevent sales of the product to foreign 
customers unless the good is produced locally; or it could result from the greater ease of 
adjusting the product to accommodate local tastes if production occurs on site, or if the 
distribution outlets are owned by the manufacturer.
19 These advantages may be sufficient 
19 For an extended discussion of nontax factors, see Dunning(l985 ). 
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to induce corporate investment in country c even if it is taxed less favorably than
 portfolio 
investment in country c. The greater the tax disadvantage of corporate investm
ents, the 
more important these nontax advantages must be to justify the investments. 
All of these pressures are based on the premise that firms in country i have 
some 
distinct products or technologies. The more this is the case, therefore, the grea
ter these 
nontax pressures, everything else equal. We proxy the degree to which firms in a
 country 
own distinct products or technologies by a measure of the R&D effort in that cou
ntry.20 
When the nontax advantages of investing in country care large, what options d
oes a 
firm have to reduce or eliminate any tax disadvantages of this investment? On
e option 
would be to license use of the technology to firms in country c, thereby allowing 
the tech­
nology to be used there while limiting the extent to which tax-disadvantaged in
vestment 
must occur in country c. While transferring the technology to a subsidiary m
ay allow 
better control over use of the technology, better control over access to informati
on about 
the technology, and better transfer of information about the detailed characterist
ics of the 
technology, taxes may outweigh these advantages of common ownership. 
When the gains from joint operation arise from other sources, other types of contra
ctual 
links may arise which allow the firm to avoid tax-disadvantaged capital flows. For 
example, 
if the gain from joint operation is simply common control over pricing, then carte
ls might 
be set up instead to coordinate pricing. Similarly, distribution outlets can be 
arranged 
through contractual links, as with chain stores, rather than through direct owne
rship. 
If common ownership is essential for nontax reasons, then another option is to ha
ve 
the user of the technology in country c buy the owner of the technology in count
ry i. Tax 
considerations would normally favor one direction of capital flow over the other. 
Ignoring 
withholding taxes and personal taxes, for example, the tax loss from corpora
te direct 
investment results from the corporate surtax that may be due when profits are re
patriated 
to the parent corporation. When the multinational is operating in a "high-ta
x" and a 
"low-tax" country, then this surtax would be due if profits are repatriated from t
he "low­
tax" to the "high-tax" country, but not conversely. Therefore, in this case joint o
wnership 
should occur through the firm in the "low-tax" country raising funds world-wide t
o finance 
the purchase of the firm in the "high-tax" country. If direct investment from countr
y i to 
country c is tax disadvantaged, direct investment from country c to country i is like
ly not 
to be. 
In certain cases, however, gains from joint operation may well require paying the
 extra 
taxes that result from a firm in a "high-tax" country taking over a firm in a "
low-tax" 
country. For example, when operations of the potential multinational in one co
untry are 
much larger than in the other countries, then it is much easier for this firm to
 acquire 
the other firms. If so, how large a capital flow is needed to acquire the gains from
 joint 
operation, and are further gains possible through larger capital flows? The sur
tax paid, 
everything else equal, will be proportional to the size of the capital fl.ow, prov
iding an 
incentive to minimize the amount of direct investment. This can be done by purc
hasing a 
smaller share of the equity in the subsidiary or by using relatively more debt in 
financing 
20 Since we only examine the pattern of foreign investments made in one coun
try, the U.S., we cannot 
readily test the effects of variation in the characteristics of the host count
ry, e.g. the severity of trade 
barriers. 
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investments there. It might also be done by setting up a joint venture, in which most of 
the financing comes from the foreign partner. The share of the profits going to the firm in 
country i can be adjusted as needed to reflect the value of the technology it contributes to 
the joint venture. In each case, corporate direct investment from country i to country c is 
reduced or eliminated while still maintaining the economic advantages of joint operation. 
A variety of other nontax factors could also prove to be important. One obvious 
one is the use of capital controls in a number of the countries in our sample. These 
controls can take a variety of forms. France, for example, had regulations from 1981 - 1986 
which allowed the purchase of foreign assets only from other French residents, in principle 
preventing any increase in portfolio investment abroad. Italy in contrast required that 
residents deposit funds equal to fifty percent of the amount invested abroad in an interest­
free account. We saw no way to capture directly the effects of such diverse regulations on 
equity flows. 
In order to test for the possible importance of capital controls, we simply included 
a dummy variable, denoted by Cit, which is set equal to one if in that country in that 
year significant restrictions exist on portfolio investment abroad. We experimented with 
alternative definitions of "significant." Countries with capital controls would be expected 
to have less portfolio investment abroad. We also tested to see whether controls make 
portfolio investment less responsive to changes in tax incentives. 
3. Data on relative tax rates and the composition of capital flows 
In order to test the sensitivity of the composition of international capital flows to these 
tax incentives, we have collected data on the relative tax treatment of portfolio vs. direct 
investment in the U.S. coming from each of ten other countries, and the composition of 
capital flows to the U.S. from each of these countries during the period 1980-89. These ten 
countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the U.K. 21 
Relative tax rates 
In total, we need data for mi, ml, Wei, w;i, Tc, Tei, rt, Aci, R&D intensity, and the dummy 
variable Cit measuring the presence of capital controls, yearly from 1980 to 1989. 
mi: To begin with, we set mi equal to the top marginal tax rate prevailing in country i in 
each year. Where appropriate, we took into account both Federal and local tax schedules. 
Given the concentration of wealth holdings among investors in the top tax brackets and 
given the greater tendency among those in the highest tax brackets to invest in equity, 
this assumption seemed reasonable.
22 Data on these rates were taken from various issues 
21 Data were also available for Bermuda and the Netherlands Antilles, but we decided 
not to include 
these data since the above theory was not designed to address the consequences of inve
sting from country 
i to country c through some third country j. 
22 This ignores, however, purchases of equity by financial intermediaries, e.g. pension pl
ans, which are 
subject to very different tax treatment. When we test for evasion of personal taxes o
n all purchases of 
equity by setting m; = mi = 0, this also provides a test for the possibility that equity purchases mainly 
occur through pension plans. 
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of Coopers and Lybrand's International Tax Summaries.
23 The resulting tax rates for 
the period 1980-9 are reported in Table Al. In most of the regressions, however, we set 
mi equal to zero, on the presumption that individuals can easily evade domestic taxes on 
portfolio investments abroad. 
m;: To calculate m;, we used our estimate of the top marginal tax rate along with in­
formation about the characteristics of any dividend imputation scheme available in country 
i in that year. This information was again taken from Coopers and Lybrand's International 
Tax Summaries.24 The resulting tax rates are reported in Table A2. 
Wi and w;: Here, we simply used statutory rates for dividend payments from country 
c to country i in that year, as reported by Coopers and Lybrand. These withholding 
tax rates are reported in Table A3. These figures ignore the possibility of firms routing 
dividend payments through a third country.25 
r/ and rt: In each case, we used the statutory rate that applied to the largest firms 
in that year. Data again Caine from Coopers and Lybrand. When state or provincial 
governments in that country also taxed corporate profits, we used a combined tax rate.
26 
This approach does not take into account the possibility that firms may have tax losses, 
so face a zero marginal tax rate, or be subject to supplementary taxes, e.g. an alternative 
minimum tax. When the statutory tax rate changed during the calendar year, we used 
a weighted average tax rate. The resulting tax rates are reported in Table A4. A few of 
the countries in the sample use a split-rate system, taxing income that is retained at a 
different rate than income that is paid out as dividends. For these countries, both rates 
are reported in Table A4. 
Tc, Tei, and Aci: By definition, Tc = (T:x~1)/xcf, and Tei = (T/x~1 )/Xcf• In ea
ch 
case, the numerator equals actual tax payments, while the denominator equals economic 
income, so that the ratio measures an effective corporate tax rate. For Tc, this is the 
effective corporate tax rate on foreign holdings in the U.S. Most firms operating in the 
U.S. will have at least some foreign owners, though the fraction will vary by firm. We 
simply assumed that the effective tax rate on foreign holdings is the same as that on firms 
as a whole operating in the U.S., regardless of ownership, so measured Tc by the ratio 
of actual corporate tax payments to a measure of economic income.
27 Specifically, we 
measured Tc by the ratio of direct taxes on income to operating surplus less net interest 
23 Data from Australia and the U.K. were adjusted in certain years to take account of the difference 
between their fiscal year and the calendar year. 
24 When tax changes occurred in midyear, we used a weighted average tax rate for that year. 
25 This omission creates a problem only to the degree to which the opportunities differ by country or 
over time. But the size of the withholding tax to be avoided differs very little across countries or over 
time, as seen in Table A3, while access to tax havens should be very similar. Therefore, our results should 
be robust to this omission. 
26 Where possible, we attempted to duplicate the procedure for calculating the combined rate used 
in Pechman(1988). For Switzerland, the combined rate is the maximum rate payable by a corporation 
operating out of Zurich. 
27 
Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1991), however, found that the average tax rate paid by foreign 
subsidiaries in the U.S. was much less than that paid by other firms. We assume that this is due to 
financial arbitrage engaged in by these firms, measured in our theory by ,abs(r/ - ri), rather than due 
to differences in the tax treatment of foreign-owned firms. 
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paid for the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector, as reported in the "Accounts for Non­
Financial Corporate and Quasi-Corporate Enterprises" in the OECD's National Accounts 
1976-88. 
In measuring Tei, the appropriate definition is less clear, since existing data sources do 
not report directly the average tax rate on foreign-source income. As a result, we explored 
several alternative approaches. The first and simplest approach is to set Tei equal to Tti, the 
statutory tax rate. This definition would be appropriate if each country defined taxable 
did notforeign-source income based on some approximation to economic income, e.g. 
extend various subsidies such as investment credits or accelerated depreciation to capital 
invested abroad. This in fact approximates the U.S. law. 
Our second approach assumes implicitly that each country measures U.S.-source tax­
able income based on the U.S. tax rules, implying that firms do not in practice recalculate 
their taxable income when profits are repatriated. In this case, Tei = Tt(x~1/ Xcf) = 
Tf(Tc/T:). Given this approach, Tei - Tc= Pcc(T! - T:) so that differences in effective tax 
rates are measured by differences in statutory tax rates, up to a multiplicative factor. 
Our third approach assumes that foreign-source income is measured based on the 
domestic tax law in each of these countries, without modification due to its foreign source. 
As a first pass, the average tax rate on foreign-source income should then equal that on 
domestic-source income.28 
Yet a fourth approach to measuring Tei would be to infer the effective tax rate based on 
the user cost of capital in each year, constructed using detailed information about corporate 
tax provisions. This is the approach used, for example, in Slemrod(1990). As argued in 
Bradford-Fullerton(l981), this measure of the effective tax rate can be very sensitive to 
assumptions made about such things as the required rate of return. More importantly, if 
reported earnings are not coming primarily from the return to marginal capital, as argued 
in Gordon-Slemrod(1988), then an effective tax rate measure based on the user cost of 
capital will be very misleading. Instead, the statutory rate should become more important. 
This provides an alternative justification for our second approach to measuring Tei, which 
results in a comparison of statutory tax rates. 
One complication for each of these definitions is the existence in some countries of a 
split-rate corporate tax system in which the tax rate on retained earnings is different than 
the tax rate on earnings paid out as dividends. As seen in expression (3), the only place 
that Tei enters relates to the tax treatment of dividend payments. Therefore, for the first 
two definitions of Tei, we used the statutory rate applied to earnings paid out as dividends 
in countries with a split-rate corporate tax system. Things are a little more complicated 
under the third definition. Here, Tei refers to the average corporate tax rate for earnings 
paid out as dividends. We observe only the average tax rate on earnings, whether retained 
or paid out, which we now denote by T:i· We estimate Tei by assuming that the average 
tax rate on retentions has the same relation to the statutory tax rate on retentions as the 
average tax rate on payouts has to that statutory tax rate. 
28 The two average tax rates can still differ for various reasons. For example, given the la.ck of indexation 
for inflation in the definition of taxable income in any of these countries, the effective tax rate on foreign­
source income should differ from that on domestic-source income due to any differences in the inflation 
rates in the two countries, for the reasons discussed in Feldstein(1980a,b). 
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Only the third definition for Tei required new data. We measured the average corporate 
tax rate in country i using the same procedure and data source used in measuring Tc. There 
were missing data in these publications, however, for Canada, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
For Canada, we found comparable data in the Corporate Financial Statistics issued by 
Statistics Canada, which we used to calculate the Canadian rates. For Switzerland and 
the U.K., however, we were not able to find even roughly comparable data, so used instead 
the statutory corporate tax rate. The resulting measures of the average corporate tax 
rate are reported in Table A5. These figures are surprisingly volatile, often changing 
substantially from one year to the next. In four cases, all during the early 1980's, the 
resulting tax rate exceeds 100%. The cause of this volatility is unclear. It could be caused, 
for example, by the importance of no-loss-offset during the recession in the early 1980's. 
Alternatively, if investment credits on new investment or rapidly accelerated depreciation 
allowances are used to offset heavy future tax payments, then observed tax rates will be 
unusually high during periods of low investment, as in the early 1980's, and conversely. 
It seems unlikely that firms would respond much to these year-to-year fluctuations in 
incentives, even if the incentives were measured correctly - behavior should respond to a 
weighted average of expectations of future as well as current tax incentives. Given these 
problems, this measure seems much weaker than either of the first two measures. These 
first two definitions in practice are very similar. In the empirical work, we focus on the 
second measure, but report selected results using the other two measures for Tei• 
We also need to measure Aci = (1 - rc)/(Pci - re). Here, we make use of the relation 
Pei= rcdrti, and substitute the appropriate measure of each of the tax variables. 
R&D intensity: We measured R&D intensity in year t by the average value in country 
i of R&D/GDP during years t - 3 tot - 1, and denote this average ratio by Rit-
29 
Cit: This variable was set equal to one for country i in those years in which there 
were substantial capital controls. Some important controls existed in Australia (1980-
84), France (1981-6), Italy (1980-7), Japan (1980-6), and Sweden (1980-88). Our loosest 
definition of capital controls sets Cit = 1 during each of these years. The nature of these 
controls differed substantially by country and over time, however. For example, Italy 
during the period of controls required that re&idents deposit funds equal to fifty percent of 
the amount invested abroad in an interest-free account, thereby sharply discouraging open 
ownership of foreign equity. These controls were gradually phased out during 1983-7. In 
contrast, during 1981-6 France prevented investors from purchasing equity from abroad, 
but existing holdings of foreign equity could continue without penalty and be traded within 
France. As a result, the French provisions should not in themselves have lowered portfolio 
holdings abroad, but would have prevented individuals from responding to any increase 
in incentives encouraging further portfolio investment abroad. During 1980-6, the main 
restrictions in Japan involved tight limits on the amount of foreign securities that financial 
intermediaries could purchase. Since Japanese investors own directly relatively little equity, 
these controls may well have affected aggregate portfolio investment in foreign equity, even 
though they did not restrict direct purchases of foreign equity. Our strictest definition of 
capital controls assumed that the Japanese provisions did not affect equity flows, that the 
29 Assuming a one to three year lag between R&D expenditures and available technology is representative 
of the results found in empirical productivity studies, e.g. Griliches(1980). 
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French regulations had no effect, and that Italy had effectively ended its capital controls 
during 1987. The third and main definition we focused on was an intermediate case in 
which we weakened this latter definition by assuming that the Japanese controls were 
binding through 1986. 
What do these numbers imply for the differential tax treatment of portfolio vs. direct 
investment from each of these ten countries into the U.S.? As seen in equation (3), the 
net tax advantage to portfolio investment consists of three terms, the first measuring 
the tax differences assuming no corporate surtax when profits are repatriated, the second 
measuring the corporate surtax assuming that firms are in a deficit-credit position, and the 
third measuring the potential gain from shifting taxable income between the two countries. 
Given the estimates of the various tax parameters reported in Tables Al-A5, we calculated 
each of these terms. The resulting values for the first tax term are reported in Tables 1 
and la, making alternative assumptions about evasion, those for the second tax term are 
reported in Table 2, while those for the last term are reported in Table 3. 
The figures in Table 1 report the value of (1 - Tc)[w;i + (1 - w;i)mt - max(mi, Wei)], 
assuming no evasion of personal income taxes. These figures suggest substantial variation 
across countries in the personal tax treatment of portfolio vs. direct investment. Most 
of this variation is due to the effects of dividend imputation schemes. France, Germany, 
Italy, and the U.K. all have important imputation schemes, and Australia adopted such 
a system in 1987, as can be seen comparing the values of mi vs. mt' in Tables Al and 
A2. The result, as seen in Table 1, is a substantial personal tax advantage to direct over 
portfolio investment in these countries. Canada and Japan have less important imputation 
schemes, yielding only a slight tax advantage to direct investment. Personal taxes made 
little difference in the other countries. If personal taxes on portfolio investments are 
evaded, then the results change dramatically, as seen in Table la where this expression 
is reevaluated under the assumption that mi = 0. Now there is a dramatic personal tax 
advantage to portfolio investment. 
Table 2 reports the size of the corporate surtax, assuming that firms are in a deficit­
credit position. For countries which exempt foreign source income, the corporate surtax is 
zero. For Italy and France, which use a hybrid system, the corporate surtax term equals 
instead (1-Tc)(l - ml)(l - e)(Tei -w;i). For countries using a crediting system, the term 
equals (1 - ml) [Aci(Tei - Tc) - w;i(l - re)]. In the figures in Table 2, Tei is set equal to 
T!(Tc/Tn.30 These tax terms are generally smaller than those reported in Table 1, and 
dramatically smaller than those in Table la, suggesting that differences in the personal 
tax treatment of portfolio vs. direct investment are much more important. 
The term measuring the potential gain from transfer pricing is reported in Table 3. For 
countries with a split-rate corporate tax system, we use the tax rate applied to retained 
earnmgs. 
30 The figures under the two alternative measures of Tei are qualitatively very similar. 
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Data on the composition of capital flows 
The initial source of data for direct vs. portfolio investment by residents of country i in 
U.S. equity came from the Survey of Current Business, using data compiled by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. These accounts, however, report data on direct investment in equity 
only from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the U.K. Similarly, the published tables 
include data on portfolio investment in equity only for investors from Canada and Japan. 
Smith W. Allnut III of the Bureau of Economic Analysis kindly provided us with internal 
estimates of direct investment in U.S. equity for the other six countries in our sample, 
while Harlan King also of the Bureau of Economic Analysis provided us with estimates of 
portfolio equity investment in the U.S. for the remaining eight countries. 
Inevitably, these data do not measure precisely what we want. To begin with, if a 
corporation investing in a foreign firm does not own at least 10% of the shares in this 
firm, then the investment is reported as portfolio investment. Similarly, if an individual 
investor purchases more than 10% of a foreign firm, then this purchase is reported as a 
direct investment. In addition, the book figures for direct investment become misleading 
due to inflation in the U.S, for the same reasons that book capital figures can be misleading 
for domestic firms. Fortunately, the direct investment in the U.S. tends to be quite recent, 
and the inflation rate in the U.S. during the 1980's has been relatively low. Another com­
plication is that the balance sheet figures are based on infrequent benchmark surveys, with 
updates based on reported flows derived from a more limited sample. If investors transfer 
funds to the U.S. through a third country, perhaps to avoid domestic or withholding taxes, 
then the reported fl.ow figures but not the benchmark figures will attribute the capital fl.ow 
to this third country.31 For both reasons, between benchmark surveys the reported values 
can accumulate errors, as argued by Slemrod(1990). We were not in a position to correct 
for any of these possible measurement errors, so simply assume that they are uncorrelated 
with the measures of the tax variables. If so, then the measurement errors lead to a larger 
standard error of the regression but do not bias the coefficients. 
The resulting figures for the fraction of equity flows from each country to the U.S. that 
take the form of direct investment are reported in Table 4. As seen in the Table, these 
figures vary substantially across countries. On average, for example, 90.9% of the equity 
flows from Sweden to the U.S. take the form of direct investment, whereas the comparable 
figure for Switzerland is only 23.3%. This strikingly low figure for Switzerland suggests that 
portfolio investors from third countries, who route their investments through Swiss financial 
intermediaries so as to avoid domestic taxation, may form an important if not dominant 
component of the capital flows from Switzerland. While in principle, the U.S. data reports 
the ultimate beneficial owner, Swiss banking regulations prevent the nationality of the 
ultimate owner from being revealed. Another country whose data might be suspect is the 
Netherlands. Due to the low withholding taxes on interest payments from the U.S. to the 
Netherlands and the territorial treatment of firms by the Netherlands, multinationals often 
found it attractive to funnel investments through the Netherlands. The high fraction of 
direct investment from the Netherlands, in spite of their lack of any capital controls, at 
least suggests that some of it was owned by investors in other countries, in spite of the 
31 The benchmark survey asks the ultimate beneficial owner of payments made to foreign
 investors. 
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U.S. attempt to trace the ultimate beneficial owner. Given our concerns with the data 
from these two countries, we test below the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of 
these two countries. 
One immediate observation from Table 4 is that there is little systematic trend over the 
sample period or even substantial movement in the composition of equity flows, in spite of 
substantial changes in tax rates in these countries during the sample period. This tells us 
immediately that any tax effects, if found, must be subtle. 
4. Estimation 
Statistical specification 
The basic model for countries using a credit system assumes that the fraction of equity 
flows from country i to country c that takes the form of direct investment rather than 
portfolio investment is a function of the three tax terms in equation (3), where 0 = a+bTci• 
Substituting for 0gives four tax variables, denoted by Tp, Ti, T!, and Tt, where: 
For countries exempting foreign-source income, T: = T! = 0. For Italy and France, we 
defined a fifth tax term, Ti= (1- Tc)(l - mt)(l - e)(rci - w;i); its coefficient is allowed 
to differ from those of the other tax terms. 
These five variables, plus Ri and Ci, will be used to forecast the value of the ratio of 
direct investment to direct plus portfolio investment. Denote this ratio by Dci· This ratio 
is by definition between zero and one. A linear regression with this ratio as the dependent 
variable would therefore suffer from the same problems that linear probability models do. 
We therefore decided to use a logit specification. Given that we observe the population 
outcome for the choice between the two forms of equity flows, we can estimate a logit 
model using OLS, with the dependent variable being log(Dci/(1- Dci)).
32 We started out 
with the regression specification 
where €it captures the effects of factors omitted from the specification on the composition 
of equity flows. Based on the above discussion, the coefficients of T:, Tt, Ri, and Ci should 
be positive, while those of Tp, T!, and T; should be negative. 
32 See, e.g. Kmenta(1986), for a demonstration of this. 
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Regression results 
In our initial specification, we started with the following measures of the above variables: 
First, in defining Tp, we assumed personal tax evasion on portfolio investments but not 
direct investments.33 Second, we set Tei equal to rf(Tc/r:), which assumes that home gov­
ernments rely on the U.S. definition of corporate taxable income when taxing repatriated 
earnings. Finally, we used our intermediate definition for Ci. 
Using these variable definitions, we first estimated equation (4) using OLS. The result­
ing coefficient estimates are reported in column 1 of Table 5, with t-statistics reported in 
parenthesis.34 The results are rather mixed. The coefficients of R&D and capital controls 
are both of the expected sign and statistically significant. The other statistically signif­
icant variable is Tp, but its coefficient is of the wrong sign. One hypothesis concerning 
the coefficient of Tp is that countries which are less threatened by capital flight are more 
inclined to impose high personal tax rates, implying a reverse causation. We return to this 
hypothesis below. Of the remaining coefficients, those of T: and Ti have the expected 
signs while those of T; and Tt do not. All these coefficients are very small and statistically 
insignificant, however. 
To test for delayed responses to changes in incentives, we tried instead using lagged 
values of each of the independent variables. Since we did not collect tax data for 1979, the 
regression had to be run with data from 1981-9. The resulting coefficients on these lagged 
terms appear in column 2 of Table 5. The fit is slightly better statistically. The coeffi­
cients of T; and Tt now have the expected signs, though remain small and insignificant. 
Otherwise, any differences from the original specification are minor. We therefore chose to 
focus on use of contemporaneous data, in order to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom. 
Both of these regressions were estimated using OLS. Yet OLS is appropriate only if 
the error terms in the regression are homoskedastic and independent across observations. 
Given the panel nature of the sample, however, the error terms for a given country may 
be correlated over time, due for example to omitted random or fixed effects. Ignoring 
these correlations at least results in a bias in the estimates of the standard errors of 
the coefficients. If omitted country effects are correlated with the included independent 
variables, then the initial coefficient estimates are themselves biased. 
To test for the importance of these possible problems, we reestimated the initial equa­
.tion using both a fixed-effects estimator and a random-effects estimator. The resulting 
coefficient estimates assuming fixed effects are reported in column 3 of Table 5, while 
those assuming random effects appear in column 5.
35 As is apparent from the jump in 
33 One striking and anomalous implication of this assumption is that the correlation of the resulting 
values of Tp with the dependent variable is . 78, which is the highest pairv-.r:ise correlation with the dependent 
variable found in the study. Note that the sign of this correlation is the opposite of that forecast by the 
theory, a finding returned to below. 
34 As noted below, these t-statistics are biased at least due to the fact that the residuals are not inde­
pendent across observations, due to country effects. 
35 As shown in Fuller-Battese(1973), the random-effects estimator involves replacing the initial depen­
dent variable, Y;t, and independent variables X; 1 with Y; 1 - >.Y; and X; 1 - >.X; respectively. Here, Y; and 
X; are the mean values for country i over the full time period, and.>.= 1 - Ja
2 /(a 2 + Tan, where a~ 
is the estimated variance of the random effects, a 2 is the variance of the idiosyncratic component of the 
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the adjusted R2 , these country effects are highly significant as a group.
36 If the country 
effects are uncorrelated with the other included variables, then a random effects estimator 
would be appropriate. To test for this lack of correlation, we used the procedure described 
in Hausman(1978), which compares statistically the coefficient estimates from the fixed­
effects and the random-effects regressions. The resulting Hausman-test statistic is 32.9, 
which has a P-value of only 0.00003 under the appropriate x2 distribution, so strongly 
rejects the random-effects model. We therefore focus on the results from the fixed-effects 
procedure. 
The coefficient estimates that result from the fixed-effects procedure differ substantially 
from those resulting from 01S, as is seen comparing column 1 with column 3. Comparing 
the fixed-effects coefficients with the forecasts from the theory, the results are again mixed. 
The coefficient of Tp is now of the expected sign, but statistically insignificant. The 
coefficients of Tea and r: have both changed sign, both contrary to theoretical forecasts. 
Given their relative sizes, however, the net effect of the corporate surtax is still negative, 
as expected, as long as Tei < .57, which is satisfied for all the countries in our sample. All 
that is surprising is that the effect is more negative for countries with a smaller value of 
Tei- The coefficient of T;, describing the corporate tax surcharge in Italy and France, has 
also changed to the expected sign, and is statistically significant. While the coefficients 
of the R&D and the capital-controls variables still have the expected signs, they are no 
longer significant.37 The main inconsistency with the theory is the coefficient of Tt, which 
is not only of the wrong sign but highly significant. The economic effect implied by the 
coefficient is small, however. Given the logit specification for the dependent variable, 
l8Dit/8Tf I= Dit(l - Dit)f3s:::; .25/35 , implying tiny effects of Tf on Dit, given the various 
parameter values. Given the multiple ways in which tax rates enter the regression, and 
the small sample size, it is difficult to interpret each coefficient too strongly. 
The estimates for the country dummies in the fixed-effects regression are reported in 
Table 6. Of the six countries with positive coefficients, four had capital controls during at 
least some part of the sample period, and the data from one of the others (the Netherlands) 
is likely to overestimate the size of Dit· These coefficients rather than the capital-control 
dummy would capture the effects of capital controls if these effects did not disappear 
quickly with the official end of capital controls. Learning lags could explain this slow 
response, suggesting stronger effects of capital controls than are captured by the capital­
controls dummy. The only significant negative coefficient is that for Switzerland, where 
we also view the data to be suspicious. 
The differences between the fixed effects results and the OLS results reflect the relative 
lack of time-series variation in the data but the substantial variation in average levels of 
Dit across countries. In order to highlight these conflicting aspects of the data, we also 
residual, and T is the number of years. As the estimate of>. approaches one, the random-effects estimator 
approaches the fixed-effects estimator. In this specification, the estimate of >. was 0.83, explaining the 
similarity of the coefficient estimates in the two cases. 
36 The value of the F-test for omitting the country dummies in the fixed effects procedure is 3.2, compared 
with a 5% significance level of about 1.35. 
37 Our definition of R&D is likely to measure poorly the timing of effects of R&D, so that weaker estimated 
effects in the fixed effects model should not be surprising. 
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report results from a between-effects regression in column 4 of Table 5, in which country 
averages of each variable over the ten year period are used. The only coefficient whose sign 
is contrary to the theory is again Tp. Given the small number of countries in the sample, 
it is not surprising that t-statistics for the coefficient estimates are so low. Since it may 
be difficult to capture the timing of tax effects adequately in the fixed-effects regressions, 
these results do provide an important independent view of the nature of these tax effects. 
Given our suspicions about the quality of the data from Switzerland and the Nether­
lands, we tried dropping these two countries from the sample. The last column in Table 
5 reports OLS results using the eight remaining countries. The main change is that the 
coefficients of Tea and T: are now dramatically larger and still of the correct sign. The 
coefficients of R&D and capital controls are also much larger. Tp still has the wrong sign, 
however. 
In Table 7, we explore a variety of alternative definitions of the variables. Column 1 
repeats the fixed-effects results from Table 5. In column 2, we try the stricter definition of 
the capital controls variable; little changes, except that the coefficient of Ci is now negative 
but insignificant. (Results with the looser definition of Ci are very close to those in column 
1.) We also tried alternative assumptions about personal tax evasion; again, little changes. 
The results assuming no evasion are reported in column 3. In columns 4 and 5, we measure 
Tei using the two alternative definitions explored above. The coefficients of the corporate 
surtax terms do turn out to be very sensitive to the choice of this definition, though the 
other coefficients do not change much. When rci = rf, all three of these coefficients are 
of the expected sign; when the average corporate tax rate is used, Tg and T: have the 
More work is needed to assessexpected signs, but Ti flips to having the wrong sign.38 
how foreign-source corporate income is measured in practice in these countries before the 
behavioral effects of this corporate surtax can be judged with any confidence. 
One complication in interpreting any of the above results is that government policy 
variables could well be endogenous, given the importance of tax evasion in many of these 
countries. To begin with, capital controls make it much easier to impose high personal tax 
rates, since evasion of these taxes through investing abroad would be discouraged by the 
capital controls. This merely suggests a correlation between the independent variables,
39 
which does not create statistical bias. In addition, however, countries where for institu­
tional or geographic reasons investors can more easily shift funds abroad should find it 
more costly to impose high personal tax rates. In itself, this suggests a reverse effect of 
the dependent variable on m7, biasing the coefficient estimates generally, but primarily 
creating a positive bias in the coefficient of Tp. The very high positive correlation in the 
data between TP and the dependent variable certainly suggests such a reverse causation. 
Countries facing more pressure from capital flight, everything else equal, should also be 
more likely to adopt capital controls, in order to lessen these pressures. This suggests that 
the residual will also be negatively correlated with Ci. Vle therefore experimented with 
two-state-least-squares estimation methods, treating Ci and m7 as endogenous. In partic-
38 Since foreign direct investment and average tax rates can both be affected by cyclical factors, these
 
coefficients must be judged with some caution. 
39 The correlation between Tp and C; in our sample is 0.56, very much supporting this story. 
20 
ular, we collected data on the top marginal tax rate on wages
40 in each of these countries, 
and the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, to use as instruments. The higher the tax rates are 
on labor income, and the higher the amount of revenue the government desires, everything 
else equal, the more likely the country is to raise revenue from taxes on financial income, 
and the more likely it is to impose capital controls to facilitate this taxation of financial 
income. While no aggregate variable will be entirely exogenous, any effects of the depen­
dent variable on these series should be trivial, making them reasonable instruments. The 
variables Tp, T:,, T!, and Ci were all treated as endogenous. Rather than using the two 
instruments directly, we included six variables constructed using them,
41 along with the 
remaining variables from the original regression, in each of the four auxiliary regressions. 
The results, without fixed effects, are reported in column 6 of Table 7. These results ought 
to be compared with the OLS results in column 1 of Table 5. As expected, the coefficient 
of Tp dropped substantially and now has the expected sign, while the coefficient of Ci 
became dramatically larger. Reverse causation does appear to be an important factor. 
The coefficients of the remaining tax variables all change sign, still leaving two with the 
sign forecast by the theory. They all remain statistically insignificant, however. 
Another possible complication is that capital controls may hinder any new portfolio 
flows, but may not force investors to liquidate unreported investments they have already 
made abroad. Even though the U.S. government knows about the nationality of these 
portfolio investors, this does not imply that the home government is in a position to 
prosecute specific cases of tax evasion or evasion of controls. To test for this, we allowed 
capital controls to reduce the sensitivity of the dependent variable to tax distortions, as well 
as to change the mean value of the dependent variable. In particular, we multiplied each 
of the tax factors in equation ( 4) by (1-aCi), then estimated a using a grid search.
42 Our· 
expectation was that 0 ~ a < 1. The resulting estimate of a, starting from the original 
OLS specification, was -1.55. Surprisingly, behavior seemed more sensitive to tax rates in 
countries with capital controls, though tax effects are still small. 
5. Conclusions 
Existing tax structures in our sample countries have important effects on the relative 
attractiveness to individuals of buying foreign equity directly vs. having a domestic firm 
they own buy these shares instead, particularly given the ease with which individuals 
appear able to evade domestic taxes on portfolio investments abroad. To what degree 
do these distortions change behavior? The composition of equity flows does differ dra­
matically among these countries, and at least part of the explanation appears to be tax 
differences. Behavior did not seem to change much during the 1980's, however, in spite of 
40 Given the equivalence in present-value of value-added taxes and wage taxes, this varia
ble captures 
the combined effects of both. 
41 In particular, the six instruments were: tax revenue/GDP, (tax revenue/GDP)2, Tp with 
m'7 replaced 
by the top marginal tax rate on labor, this variable squared, and both Ti and Tf with m; replaced by 
the top marginal tax rate on labor. 
42 In doing this, we used our loosest definition of C;, since the controls in France should re
duce the 
responsiveness of D; to taxes even if they do not discourage ownership of foreign equity 
per se. 
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the many large changes in tax rates that occurred during this period. Part of the expla­
nation appears to be the important of capital controls in many of the sample countries. 
Another problem making inference more difficult is that tax policy itself seemed to be 
endogenous - countries where investors could more easily invest abroad were more likely 
to have lower tax distortions and to impose capital controls. In principle, the increasing 
international integration of financial markets and the steady reduction of capital controls 
should lead to increasing responsiveness of the composition of international capital flows 
to tax distortions. As a result, countries will be under increasing pressure to reduce these 
tax distortions, and past behavior suggests that they will in fact respond to this pressure. 
22 
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................................. ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
---·------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Japan -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.030 
Canada -0.028 -0.024 -0.033 -0.035 -0.036 -0.060 -0.052 -0.026 -0.014 -0.013 
France -0.097 -0.107 -0.100 -0.104 -0.107 -0.110 -0.126 -0.126 -0.126 -0.125 

























Italy -0.043 -0.047 -0.050 -0.066 -0.122 -0.136 -0.130 -0.127 -0.127 -0.165 
Sweden 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 
Switzerland 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029 
Australia 0.034 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.044 -0.092 -0.187 -0.138 




---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Japan 0.357 0.392 0.419 0.437 0.433 0.445 0.427 0.401 0.400 0.312 
Canada 0.245 0.277 0.204 0.212 0.218 0.200 0.234 0.233 0.201 0.206 
France 0.160 0.176 0.236 0.246 0.252 0.259 0.178 0.164 0.164 0.162 

























Italy 0.284 0.311 0.333 0.284 0.237 0.211 0.202 0.197 0.197 0.074 
Sweden 0.410 0.450 0.487 0.482 0.488 0.480. 0.461 0.430 0.416 0.399 
Switzerland 0.067 0.072 0.077 0.061 0.065 0.056 0.054 0.023 0.039 0.034 
Australia 0.292 0.320 0.342 0.357 0.366 0.376 0.352 0.170 0.048 0.091 
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------





1981 1982 1983 
---------------- ---------------- ----------------
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
1984 1985 1986 1987 




Japan -0.035 -0.038 -0.041 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.040 -0.021 -0.002 0.011 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

























U.K. -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.024 -0.060 -0.104 -0.140 -0.088 -0.059 -0.063 
Italy 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.032 0.033 0.036 0.044 0.052 0.070 
Sweden 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.028 0.030 
Switzerland -0.140 -0.158 -0.169 -0.224 -0.243 -0.255 -0.247 -0.165 -0.101 -0.100 
Australia -0.058 -0.063 -0.068 -0.071 -0.072 -0.074 -0.074 -0.051 -0.043 -0.086 
Table 3. Difference in Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 
................................... ___ .,. ____________ ----------------
1980 
_______________ ..,_ ---------------- ------------------
................................. ----------------· ----------------
1981 1982 1983 
---------------- ---------------- ----------------
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
1984 1985 1986 1987 




Japan 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.065 0.068 0.068 0.118 0.174 0.158 
Canada 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.070 0.090 0.050 

























U.K. 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.047 0.097 0.147 0.100 0.040 0.040 
Italy 0.147 0.147 0.097 0.097 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.013 0.073 0.073 
Sweden 0.058 0.058 0.064 0.064 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.067 0.127 0.127 
Switzerland 0.131 0.135 0.135 0.171 0.183 0.183 0.185 0.125 0.076 0.076 
Australia 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.025 0.050 0.000 






1981 1982 1983 
---------------- ................................... ----------------
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Japan 85.0 88.2 87.8 85.5 88.9 87.0 76.0 62.3 67.7 64.9 
Canada 45.0 43.9 40.5 35.6 43.6 41.3 39.1 43.5 42.4 40.4 

























U.K. 46.9 51.3 52.6 48.1 48.9 45.0 43.0 50.8 55.7 52.3 
Italy 39.4 78.2 80.5 77.4 75.3 62.3 57.3 64.9 60.8 56.9 
Sweden 91.4 92.4 87.1 88.1 94.8 90.9 94.4 95.3 92.0 82.5 
Switzerland 18.0 19.8 21.5 20.6 24.2 22.0 20.2 24.9 29.1 32.3 
Australia 45.0 71.6 59.9 57.8 75.7 74.5 72.1 78.7 73.5 70.9 
--~-r·:, 






























































































































Notes: 1. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
2. The regression using lagged independent variables is based on 90 observations, 1981-1989 
by 10 countries; all others based on 100 observations, 1980-1989 by 10 countries. 
-------------------- -------------- --------------
---------------------------------- --------------






















Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
------------- ------
Table A1. Top Individual Income Tax Rates 
(percent) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Japan 80 80 80 80 78 78 78 76 76 65 
Canada 63 63 50 50 50 50 55 52 46 47 
France 60 60 65 65 65 65 58 57 57 57 
Germany 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Netherlands 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
U.K. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 45 40
w
w Italy 72 72 72 65 65 62 62 62 62 50 
Sweden 86 86 87 83 82 79 79 76 74 72 
Switzerland 23 23 23 20 20 19 19 14 16 16 
Australia 60 60 60 60 60 60 59 53 49 49 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Coopers & Librand, various issues 
Notes: 
1. Combined federal and local rates are reported where applicable. 
2. When the tax rate changed during the calendar year, a weighted average tax rate is used. 
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ---------------------------- -------------- --------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
-------------- --------------
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ---------------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Table A2. Top Individual Income Tel?( Rates, Net of Divided Tax Credit 
(percent) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- .................................... -------------- -------------- --------------
73 73 73 70 70 56Japan 75 75 75 75 
36 36 36 36 42 43 38 39Canada 50 52 
48 48 48 37 36 36 36France 40 40 48 . 
31 31 31 31 31 31 31Germany 31 31 31 
72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72Netherlands 72 72 w 
~ 
U.K. 43 43 43 43 43 43 44 45 26 
20 
45 41 41 41 41 22Italy 63 63 63 53 
79 74Sweden 86 87 87 83 82 79 76 
72 
20 20 19 19 14 16 16Switzerland 23 23 23 
8 1660 60 60 60 59 29Australia 60 60 
Source: Authors' calculation based on Coopers & Librand and Table A1. 
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Table A3. Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends: Corporate recipient/individual recipient 
(percent) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Japan 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 
Canada 15 15 15 15 15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 
France 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 
Germany 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
v.) Netherlands 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15
\J1 
U.K. 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 
Italy 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 
Sweden 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 
Switzerland 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 
Australia 15 1'5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Source: Coopers & Ubrand, various issues 
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Table A4. Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 
(percent) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Japan 56/44 56/44 56/44 56/44 58/46 58/46 58/46 57/45 56/44 55/47 
Canada 51 51 51 51 51 52 53 52 48 44 
France 50 50 50 50 50 50 45 45 42 39/42 
Germany 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 56/36 
Netherlands 48 48 48 48 43 43 42 42 40 35 
U.K. 52 52 52 51 46 41 36 35 35 35 
w 
~ 
Italy 36 36 41 41 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Sweden 57 57 57 57 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Switzerland 38 38 38 34 33 33 33 33 31 31 
Australia 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 48 44 39 
U.S. 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 45 39 39 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Coopers & Lybrand, various issues 
Notes: 
1. Combined federal and local rates are reported where applicable. 
2. When the tax rate changed during the calendar year, a weighted average rate is reported. 
3. In a split rate system, the first rate applies to retained earnings and the second to dividends. 
Table A5. Average Corporate Income Tax Rates, Based on 
O.E.C.D., National Accounts (percent) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Japan 49 51 50 48 46 46 42 44 45 53 
Canada territorial 






Italy 23 71 117 41 40 31 27 35 32 32 
Sweden 88 125 52 51 33 30 30 45 42 67 
Switzerland unavailable 
Australia 60 77 128 106 47 44 49 51 45 39 
U.S. 43 37 33 30 28 26 29 31 31 32 
Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD National Accounts, 1977-1989. 
Note: See the text for an explanation of the tax rates larger than 100%. 
